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THE RESPONSE OF AFRICAN PEASANTS IN THE CAPE TO ECONOMIC CHAHGES, 
1870-1910: A STUDY IN GROWTH AND DECAY (1) 
I am investigating the response of rural African society in 
South Africa to the economic, social and political pressures implicit 
in a period of modernization and rapid change. Did rural Africans, in 
the post-mineral years, respond to the quickening of the commercial 
pace and, if so, to what degree? Was there a deliberate entry by 
African peasants (2) into the market economy, any attempt to modernize 
or commercialize their agricultural methods, and how successful were 
such entry and attempt? 
The prevailing consensus answer to these questions is, 
briefly, that "Africans failed to adapt their tribal economy to the 
changed circumstances of relative land scarcity or to learn from their 
white neighbours more modem methods of farmingf1 (3) , that traditional 
social practices and hostility to innovation are root causes of "the 
economic problems of the Bantutl. Monica Wilson has recently queried 
this doctrine (4) - as, implicitly, does Robertsonts 1935 article (5) - 
but her treatment is brief and lacks systematic description or analysis. 
I shall argue that African cultivators responded to economic 
stimuli and pressures, to a considerably greater extent than has 
hitherto been realized; that this resyonse took place at two 'llevelsll, 
at the more sophisticated of which it equalled or excelled that of 
white cultivators. Finally, the response was nowhere maintained or 
consolidated; on the contrary, peasant progress gave way to privation, 
shortfall, and failure. I shall attempt to explain this collapse of 
what seemed, for a generation or so immediately after the mineral 
discoveries, to portend a small class of well-to-do African farmers, 
and a larger peasant population that could feed itself. I suggest that 
the structure of economic and social relations created in the rural 
areas was not merely the product of penetration by the capitalist 
economy but that the structure, once established, provided the basis 
for maintaining that penetration and hence for perpetuating those 
relationships. 
The peasant response took place on two levels. First, the 
peasant community as a whole, in various regions and at various times, 
entered the exchange economy and made certain adaptations in its 
methods of production. Such a community sought to sell its "normal 
surplus" (6) while retaining communal land tenure; with axe and plough 
a greater area could be cultivated, and men did the tilling; grain, 
mimal products and (less often) stock were disposed of to meet the 
demands of taxation and new wants. 
Secondly, a small proportion of peasant farmers emerged who 
responded much more fully to economic opportunities and needs. Often, 
but not necessarily, ftmission" or "school" Africans, they sought to 
become independent small-scale commercial farmers. Such men (for whom 
we may adopt the 19th century shorthand term "progressive farmers") 
exhibited the following characteristics : i) evidence of capital 
accumulation in savings, houses, walls and fences, dams, wagons, and 
stock; ii) improved methods of agriculture, including better ploughing, 
enclosed lads, irrigation, winter crops and diversification, to 
produce readily saleable items; iii) entrepreneurship in the form of 
other inconie-raising activities, especially transport-riding, following 
harvests (which occupation brought in cash as well as allowed 
elasticity in market relations); iv) the adoption of a way of life in 
its material aspects closely paralleling that of solvent and advancing 
small farmers of other races in South Africa: comments like "Were it 
not for the colour of the occupants, I should have fancied myself in a 
European dwelling" (7) stud the late 19th century sources; progressive 
farmers built square houses, consumed European goods (8), sent their 
children to boarding schools, employed wage labourers, and leased their 
lands (sometimes white labourers or tenants). (9) v) The identity was 
ideological, too: not only did the progressive farmers support the 
white administration against "reds" and "rebels", but they displayed 
capitalist values or attitudes diametrically at variance with those of 
their tribal background. A Queenstown Mfengu farmer criticized "the 
school kaffir"  he educated man wants high wages; I endeavour to get 
the cheapest labourfr), while in Xalanga, a progressive farmer would "not 
allow squatters unless they work or are a profit to him". (10) vi) They 
sought to break with tribal holding practices, to increase their lands, 
and, ideally, to establish security of tenure by lease or purchase. 
The emergence of progressive farmers was conditional upon 
certain factors. It was more likely wherever chiefly authority had 
been weakened (cf. the Mfengu) or where chiefs themselves favoured 
progressive farming (as in Emigrant ~embuland) . The presence of 
missionaries, magistrates, and administrators who actively sought to 
create a class of landed Africans as potential collaborators (11) sped 
the appearance of progressive farmers. Then, the enterprise of that 
class was very evident at times of momentarily propitious economic 
circumstances - such an advantage might be afforded by the rise of new 
markets, or it could stem from the inflationary effects of war or troop 
movements. (12) Fourthly, the availability for any reason of extra 
land on secure tenure proved a keen spur: put simply, "the enlightened 
people . . . grab as much land as they can get". (13) Instances of swift, 
shrewd acquisition of land by purchase occurred in the Ciskei in the 
late 1850s and the 1860s, and in Komgha, where 20,000 acres were 
bought - largely from struggling white fanners - between 1902 and 
1907 (14), including much purchased by progressive farmers unable to 
expand in crowded areas of Fingoland. (15) 
A speech by a progressive farmer (16) gives a clear picture 
of the formation and characteristics of the class: 
"His parents loved stock-raising to a fault, 
and on the contrary had a laissez-faire 
attitude towards soil tillage." 
Despite them, 
"he clearly foresaw the benefits of the 
proper cultivation of the soil, and 
expressed to his father a desire to buy 
land" . 
Undeterred by his father's opposition, he went to Kingwilliamstown, and 
served in the 1877 War: 
"While ostensibly sending home my month's 
earnings to my father in the usual Native 
custom, I cunningly opened a private bank 
account into which I diverted a portion of 
my wages ... until I had saved £80.11 
At this, he bought 
'!a span of oxen with yokes, gear, plough, 
and the rest of agricultural paraphenalian 
and 
"staked his life on farmingf1. 
Within five years 
"He had made good. He bought a wagon ... 
and within a short time had accumulated 
g1,000 ... 11 now purchased a small farm ... 
and various plots of land at what was 
considered high prices in those days.'" 
He urged his listeners to do likewise - and to adopt llmodern methods of 
profit makingn. 
By 1870, the peasant response was already clearly evinced in 
some districts. The Mfengu settled in the Peddie district in 1835 had 
rapidly become "the chief economic powern among the African peoples. (17) 
They were dispersed throughout the Ciskei and across the Kei (ldutywa 
reserve in 1857; Fingoland - districts of Tsomo, Nqamakwe and 
Butterworth - in 1864). In Peddie, there were in 1865 some 30 
prosperous landowners, with farms of 500-1,000 acres, who sold forage, 
maize and millet, and were buying extra land. In 1864, at an 
Agricultural Show, it had been "universally remarked that the Fingo 
exhi'bition far excelled that of the Europeans, both for the number and 
the quality of the articles exhibitedI1. (18) Blore, in 1870, found the 
progress of the Wengu remarkable: "Taking everything into 
consideration, the native district of Peddie surpasses the European 
district of Albany in its productive powers. (19) 
In Victoria East 40 large land-holders (and 760 others who had 
enough property to qualify for the franchise) sold corn and wool 
annually, while poultry, pigs and vegetables were also marketed in Alice. 
Keiskamma Hoek sold" a great dealf1 of corn and wool each year, and 
similar reports emanated from other Ciskei settlements. (20) Close 
behind the Wengu as agriculturalists and traders were the Thembu, both 
in the l"Pambookie location" (later Glen ~rey) near Queenstown and, 
after 1864, across the Indwe river in Emigrant Tembuland. Glen Grey 
sold "a very large quantity" of wheat, maize, millet and wool; 
individual farmers ran from 500 to 1500 sheep, and wealthy Thembu were 
"frequentlyn seen in Queenstown land sales. (21) Notable economic 
gains were also made by peasants before 1870 in a swathe of country 
straddling west and north of the Ciskei: from Bedford, Somerset and 
Adelaide, through Tarka, Wodehouse and Herschel to Aliwal North. 
Finally, a class of market-oriented peasants was also present on 
certain mission stations further east than those points already 
mentioned. 
The 1870s saw the Cape jerked out of economic depression by 
diamond discoveries, and the rapid emulation by other groups of the 
Wengu/~hembu pattern, started by the eastward migration of the latter 
in 1864. (22) The Gaikas and Gcalekas entered the exchange economy to 
meet the demands of the state and the market; Sandilifs people owned 
25,000 sheep in 1873, hired others, and were selling their "lzrgest 
oxen" to buy more sheep.  h he phenomenal success of John Go, 
Brownlee's prot6g6, encouraged other "leading Gaikas" to invest in 
sheep* (23) 
Peasants in Herschel sold 6,000 bags of wheat, 1,000 bales of 
wool, and 30,000 bags of corn in 1873. In Kingwilliamstown, 100 
progressive farmers held freehold farms of 10-300 acres, while a further 
450 owned smaller plots; land sales to Africans were brisk in 1871- 
72. (24) In Fingoland, some 6,000 heads of family owned 182,000 sheep 
and 37,000 cattle; they ran the district's transport, and sold wool 
worth £60,000 in 1870, as well as hides and grain. In 1870, it had 
been estimated that Ciskei Africans sold produce worth £150,000; by 
1875, Noble assessed the purchasing power of Africans in the Ciskei and 
British Kaffraria at £400,000 and the value of their produce to be 
£750,000. A Kingwilliamstown trader paid £58,000 for peasant produce 
in 1873, and a merchant in Port Elizabeth had a turnover in 1876 of 
goods for the African trade worth £200,000. (25) The number of traders 
in African areas mushroomed. 
migrant Tembuland exported wool, grain, and hides worth 
£57,000 in 1876; progressive farmers in Xalanga had by 1878 
"advanced in wealth and material prosperity ... 
they are patterns of industry; ... they are 
better clothed, better fed, and better 
housed ...". 
Thirty-five farmers had more thau~ 500 acres. (26) By the end of the 
!7Os, East Griqualand also emerged as a centre of peasant prosperity. 
90,000 acres of land had by 1881 been bought in Umzimkulu by Africans; 
Gatberg sold grain to Queenstown, Tarkastad, Butterworth, Aliwal North 
and Basutoland. (27) 
In the 1880s, Fingoland and Emigrant Tembuland continued to 
prosper. In Nqamakwe, in May 1880, prizes at a show were awarded for 
wheat, barley, oats, potatoes, forage, maize, millet, tobacco, cabbages, 
turnips, beetroot, wool, bread, butter, dried fruit, ham, bacon, and 
handicrafts; 500 progressive farmers attended an Agricultural Society 
meeting in Southeyville in 1882 - where 5,000 bags of wheat were reaped. 
Umz imkulu, Hers chel , and the Kamas tone location (near ~ueens t own) 
produced large amounts of grain. Peasants around Kingwilliamstown 
supplied markets in East London, Queenstown, Adelaide, Somerset East, 
and Cradock; Merriman, after 15 years! absence from Kingwilliamstown, 
noted "a perfectly surprising amount of prosperity", and that land 
values had risen 500 per cent. Ehgcobo won mention in the late 180s as 
a thriving centre of agriculture and trade, and an agricultural society 
was formed. (28) 
Nor was the response confined to the level of the progressive 
farmers: the 1883 Commission on Laws and Customs has evidence of crop 
diversification and wider cultivation under communal tenure in the 
Ciskei, Glen Grey, the Eastern Cape, and parts of the Transkei. 
Queenstown!~ magistrate mentioned in 1882 that 
"all of these people ... are turning their 
attention to the growth of peas, beans, 
and fruit trees - in fact all that is 
saleable - these latter having a few years 
ago been quite unregarded by themn. 
The Bhacas, of Mount Frere District, also displayed a "marvellous 
change" in the 1880s. By mid-decade it was reported that they "always" 
exported a "considerable surplus" of wool, grain, and hides. (29) 
In the 1890s, wool became more important in the Traskeian 
economy, particularly as proportionately less agricultural produce was 
being sold than in the 1870s and 1880s. Herds and clips grew; wool 
became the chief agricultural source of cash for taxes and traders, 
especially as it was the only product that could bear the cost of 
carriage to the Colony and still leave a fair profit. (30) In 
Pondoland, annexation (1894) brought an abrupt end to a state of tribal 
subsistence, largely outside the cash economy. Taxes were levied; 
surpluses were sold (by 1900, Bizana Flagstaff, Lusikisiki and Tabavlkulu 
were exporting grain) ; traders moved in - and Mpondo moved out, to sell 
their labour in Johannesburg and other centres. 
So it can be seen that in certain areas the response of the 
peasantry to economic change was extremely positive, so much so that the 
prosperity of these areas derived largely from the prosperity of the 
African peasants there. There is good evidence that Kingwilliamstown!~ 
food was supplied almost entirely by African peasants, and that, in 
turn, their purchases supported the towncs many traders. (31)  h he 
often noted eclipse of Kingwilliamstown by East London must be due, in 
part, to the decline in the fortunes of the Ciskei peasantry - see 
below.) In Queenstown, African peasants were described in 1881 as 
"the largest producers of grain in the 
division; without them the trade of 
Queenstowr, would not be anything like 
what it is at present". (32) 
migrant Tembuland, especially Xalanga division, had a notably wealthy 
group of peasant farmers, members of which owned property worth well 
over £1,000 and who cultivated on irrigated lands a large number of 
grains, vegetables and fruits. (33) 
Moreover, in the areas mentioned immediately above, and 
elsewhere, the response by African peasants was more sensitive, the 
methods more efficient, the production greater, than that of their 
white neighbours. "Comparing them with Ehmopeansf', insisted Hemming of 
Queenstown, 
"taking man for man, and acre for acre, the 
native produces more from a smaller extent 
of ground, and with more primitive 
appliances, than the Europeans." 
H. G. Elliot and J. W. Sauer both attested that Africans produced more 
from the land in the Transkei than whites did; in Alice, Africans ran 
sheep successfully where white farmers had failed. In Xalanga, the 
wheat was pronounced by competent judges to equal any grown in South 
Africa. (34) The German peasant settlers in the Ciskei offer a useful 
comparison: in the 1860s and 1870s, reports on their progress and 
industry read for all the world like those on their African 
counterparts; by the 20th century, however, they struggled to eke out 
an existence - despite the assistance of the State, the advantages of 
larger land grants than most African peasants, and greater proximity to 
markets. (35) 
Finally, another group of progressive farmers should be 
mentioned: those who prospered by farming on the halves - a practice 
widespread in the Eastern Cape districts of Komgha, Peddie, Stutterheim, 
Albany, Alexandria, Bedford and Adelaide. These men were "virtually 
partners with the [white] farmers . . .  h hey] would sometimes cultivate 
land in a better way than was done by the white farmers themselvestV.(36) 
In district after district, however, complacent and optimistic 
reports began to be hedged with qualifications, or to contain signs that 
not all was well, On the subsistence level, communities that had 
enjoyed - if not prosperity - self-sufficient solvency were reduced, 
abruptly in some cases and more gradually in others, to stagnation, 
falling productivity, and poverty, Murmurs of disquiet from the Ciskei 
in the 1870s became more insistent in the '80s: the confiscation of 
the Gaika locations after the 1877-78 war was a turning point after 
which overcrowding, land disputes, a young landless group, indebtedness 
and a large wage-seeking group are perennial motifs. Peasants in Alice 
in 1875 had sold agricultural produce worth £19,273 and spent £21,073 
in the town stores, £4,289 of this on food; by 1925, the agricultural 
sales had fallen to £10,376, the amount spent in shops was slightly 
down (S20,048), but of this S12,748, or 63%, was spent on food. (37) 
MacMillanfs figures for Herschel, which had been so prosperous in the 
'~OS, and had a vigorous export trade in the 190s, tell the same grim 
tale. (38) Henderson and MacMillan both stress that the districts they 
describe are no worse off than the rest of the Ciskei. 
Fingoland be- to show similar symptoms in odd drought years 
during the late '70s and early '80s, but it is in the 1890s that the 
pattern of deterioration really emerges. As an experienced official 
said in 1893, "these man are far worse off than 20 years beforef1, and 
the Nqamakwe magistrate, in the same year, deplored "indications of 
retrogression and a rapid relapse into barbarismw. The process was 
summed up by the magistrate in Tsomo: 
"There are headmen m d  others who 15 years 
ago had fine square houses, fine enclosed 
gardens with fruit trees ... Today ... you 
will find the men living in huts, the 
garden wall has fallen down, and the trees 
eaten down by the goats. Fingoland has 
gone back tremendously in the last four or 
five years. It is not in the progressive 
state in which it was 15 or 20 years ago." (39) 
migrant Tembuland showed similar symptoms at the same time. In Cala, 
"there was no question about itt1, said the Chairman of the 
Municipality: "In this district they are becoming poorer than they 
were. And in Xalanga the magistrate wrote : "During the past 25 years 
I think degeneration has taken place .... The natives as a body are 
growing poorer" (40) 
In the Transkei as a whole, reports after 1900 saw the 
dependence of the territory on American maize in 1903, the desiccation 
and erosion of the land, indebtedness, and a mounting flow of migrant 
labourers. The syndrome of deterioration, once in progress, was self- 
perpetuating: one can gauge the extent of the deterioration in the 
body of evidence that chronicles the creation in the Ciskei and the 
Transkei of teeming rural ghettoes, with declining yields and with 
chronically low standards of living. (41) 
In explaining the checking of the peasant response, I can, in 
the space available, merely enumerate what seem to be the most 
significant causes, and stress their inter-relation. 
(i) The fundamental, most telling single cause was the 
expropriation of land, the peasantry's basic means of production. As 
has been written in another context, "This shortage of land is 
undoubtedly the key to their status of inferiority, exploitation, 
poverty, lack of culture, and in a word the status of underdevelopment 
of ... [those] who participate all too fully in the social process of 
capitalist development1!. (42) 
(ii) In circwnstances of land shortage, conservative agricultural 
methods and social mores inhibited productive farming: the effects of 
monoculture, the retention of cattle for non-economic reasons, 
responsibility for indigent kinsmen, and subdivision of land, all 
braked individual enterprise. (43) 
(iii) ~hysical/natural factors such as drought and stock diseases 
took their toll, the more harshly as the traditional subsistence 
economy had been replaced with greater needs and smaller resources. 
In addition to land expropriation, African peasant prosperity 
was menaced by countemailing class interests of the white settler 
communities, as expressed in land policies. The policy of creating a 
rural class of collaborators, to "counteract the influence of the chiefs" 
(see note 11) became less and less relevant after 1870, as greater and 
greater areas of potentially hostile African territory fell under white 
control. And while the wars of 1877-78 and 1881 saw the last military 
resistance in the Cape, the post-mineral years also saw the steady rise 
in the demands from mines and white farmers for black labour. 
Administrative and legislative efforts were increasingly bent towards 
enlarging the flow of labour: this involved, inter alia, weakening the 
tribal structure, increasing economic pressures and wants, and settling 
African land-holders on smaller units of land, with the deliberate 
creation of a landless class who would have to go out to work. Ln the 
earlier part of the years under review, most officials applauded the 
progressive farmers; by 1900, though, many in the Cape were hostile to 
the "wealthier classff: the Beaufort West magistrate who railed against 
"wealthy natives1f, each of whom "looks upon himself as an independent 
farmerlf, is typical. (44) In addition to their want of plentiful 
cheap labour, both mine owners and farmers - as Martin Legassick has 
suggested (45) - found it advantageous to diminish the competitiveness 
of African peasants; the farmer would benefit in the market place, 
while for the mines African labour would be both more forthcoming and 
have a reduced bargaining base. 
In short, the effect of Cape policy by about the turn of the 
century was to maintain a rurally-based class, with a falling overall 
productivity, sliding from subsistence to a sub-subsistence level. 
Richard Rose-Innes outlines his plan for creating a concentrated 
peasant population near to industrial centres, explaining: 
"1 would not make the ground .., sufficiently 
big to enable a man to become a farmer, and 
to live on the soil or out of the plot, but 
I would allow him an opportunity of 
cultivating a small plot, where he could 
leave his wife and children while he was 
labouring . . . (46) 
The sub-subsistence population would retain its base on the land, thus 
cutting down on wages, housing costs, etc., and obviating the growth of 
an urban proletariat. And wherever the Cape administrators could 
influence the matter, individually owned land units shrank. Mfengu in 
the Ciskei had been given 40 to 80 acres each in the 1850s and 1860s; 
the Tembuland Commission of 1882 set 700 "loyal nativesf' on 1-15 morgen. 
The Glen Grey Act went further: limiting all grantees to four morgen, 
it also imposed the principle of one man one lot, effectively precluding 
the accumulation of land. After 1910, Cape policy blended more 
comfortably than is usually suggested into that of the Union, whose 
land policy was deliberately slanted against progressive farmers. (47) 
(v) Migratory labour, the obverse or complement to the sub- 
subsistence rural population, was a product of, and also a factor 
perpetuating, rural degeneration: it deprived the land of its adult 
male labour for much of the year. My next point was made in 1893 by an 
official report: "These territories appear to produce labour for work 
outside them somewhat in proportion to the length of time their 
inhabitants have enjoyed good government . . .l1 (48) 
(vi) Price fluctuations and bouts of commercial depression hit the 
African territories particularly hard (illustrating, incidentally, the 
inadequacy of the dualist model for the South African economy). Each 
depression brought reports that traders would not pay cash for grain; 
that stock had to be sold to pay taxes; that traders were foreclosing 
on their debts; and that food prices had climbed. 
(vii ) Two linked disadvantages facing the African peasant were the 
distance from markets and the monopoly enjoyed by traders. With the 
advent of rail, black-white agricultural competition was sharply 
altered: "To locate the native reserves, it is no bad rule ... to look 
for the areas circumvented or entirely missed even by branch railway 
lines" (49), and competition between steam-engine and ox-wagon proved 
one-sided. On the diamond fields, American wheat railed from Cape Town 
could undercut wheat from Basutoland, until then the chief supplier. 
By 1900, crops grown in the Transkei were increasingly difficult to sell 
because of freight costs: many reports indicated underproduction 
because of lack of markets. (50) W. E. Stanford summarized it thus: 
"The easy access to the labour market ... contrasts with the difficulty 
or absolute lack of transport for agricultural produce . . .l1 (51) 
The market that 9 close at hand - the ubiquitous trader - 
was far removed from a free market. The trader could buy cheaper and 
sell dearer than the urban merchant; in Maclear, in 1903, grain was 
sold at 55/- a muid until transport riders brought in grain from 
outside, slashing the price by 50%. (52) 
(viii) Mention of rail leads to the lack of private or public 
investment, and the absence of an infrastructure to sustain economic 
development. In addition,human capital was drained from the reserves 
in the form of migrant labour, while the lack of social investment 
(education, health, etc. ) served to maintain underdevelopment. 
(ix) Economic discrimination against the peasantry went beyond 
land alienation, the lack of investment, and adverse marketing 
conditions. Customs dues were loaded against black farmers (53) ; 
regressive taxation bit into cash incomes; cash crops could be 
crippled by direct discrimination (an excise duty was imposed on 
African-grown tobacco), while, even before 1913, there were ways in 
which land purchase or leasing could be made very difficult or very 
expensive. 
(X) As it became more difficult to earn a living on the land, so 
did the more enterprising among the younger generation leave the rural 
way of life to pursue skills, schooling, and higher wages. 
* 3C * 
To summarize: capitalist penetration of the Capers African 
areas created the need for a cash income - i.e. the need to transform 
the pre-capitalist economy. That transformation, after 1870, showed 
signs of moderate success (with the creation of a stratified peasantry 
and the successful participation by some of its members in the more 
active pos t-mineral exchange economy) until various factors combined to 
halt it. The nature of his involvement in the capitalist economy, 
while enhancing the peasant's need for a cash income, distorted and 
inhibited the means of raising such an income. The peasant increasingly 
lost control over the disposal of the products of his labour (he could 
not control their exchange value or their distribution, he had to pay 
taxes and rent), and he had to produce more while receiving less in 
exchange: in a word, the degree of his exploitation rose. 
Land alienation, taxation, the lack of investment, and 
economic discrimination were obstacles to production and marketing; 
this meant that the capacity for accumulation by the peasantry declined. 
At the same time as possibilities for accumulation were diminished, 
capitalist penetration raised the demand for a cash income and market 
production; because the peasantry discovered that its overall 
productivity had decreased, it had to rely proportionately more upon 
wage labour. Those employing labour needed cheap and rightless 
labour - and the upshot was the imbedding in South Africa's economic 
development of migrant labour. Migrant labour, in turn, depleted the 
intensity of economic activity in the peasant areas, thereby 
reproducing the necessity for maintaining itself. (54) 
The llgrowth and decax of peasant communities11 (55) ir. the Cape 
and in South Africa - the response herein described and its checking - 
did not happen l1outsidel1 the development of the South African capitalist 
economy. The stifling of the peasant response really meant the 
suppression of a peasant class (it prevented further stratification, 
further commercialization, and retained the traditional, non-innovative 
features described by Hobart Houghton et al.), and the creation in its 
stead of a llrural-based migrant proletariat" (I use the term hesitantly). 
This suppression of a peasant class was a central feature of the process 
of underdevelopment in the mral areas of Southern Africa. That 
underdevelopment, retaining certain pre-capitalist features of 
production and linking them to a battery of labour-repressive devices, 
is an es3ential condition for the development of the capitalist mode of 
production in South Africa. 
Notes 
(1) This paper was prepared at a fairly early stage of my current 
research, and already stands in need of modification. I.Iowever, as 
it is being entirely recast for publication elsewhere, it appears 
here as originally presented. 
3 3 
(2) By llpeasantsv I mean "rural cultivators whose surpluses are 
transferred to a dominant group of rulers that uses the surpluses 
both to underwrite its own standard of living and to distribute 
the remainder to groups in society that do not farm ..I1. "It is 
only when a cultivator is integrated into a society with a state - 
i.e., when he becomes subject to the demands and sanctions of power 
holders outside his social stratum - that one can speak of 
pea~antry.~~ (E. R. Wolf, Peasants [~ew Jersey, 19661, pp. 3-4, 11.) 
In the South African context the tern includes cultivators on land 
under communal or individual tenure, as well as independent 
producers on white-owned land. 
(3) M. Horrell, The African Reserves of South Africa (~ohannesburg, 
1969), p. 32. She is summarizing the arguments of D. Hobart 
Hou&ton: cf. his "Some Economic Problems of the Bantu in South 
Af ricalq Johannesburg, SAIRR , 19 38) ; "Agricultural Development in 
the Reserves" (SAIRR 181/1956); "Economic Development in the 
Reserves"  a ace Relations Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. l), et al. 
(4) M. ,Wilson, "The Growth of Peasant Communitiesff, Oxford History of 
South Africa, Vol. 11, pp. 49-71 et passim. 
(5) H. M. Robertson, ?I150 Years of Economic Contact between White and 
Black11, SA Jnl. Econ., Vol. 11, No. 4, and Vol. 111, No. 1. 
(6) See W. Allen, The African Husbandman  o on don, 1965), pp. 38-41. 
( 7 )  Magistrate of Nqamakwe, Commission on Native Laws & Customs, G4-'83, 
Vol. 11, p. 268. 
(8) cf. Blyth, M., Chief Mag. of Transkei, on Finglandts llsubstantialll 
trade in clothing, ploughs, calico, prints, tinware, groceries, 
medicines, tea, coffee, bread; some of the young men played 
cricket, etc. (~.4-'83, Vol. 111, p. 266); or, magistrate of 
Herschel, where "blacking, sponges, concertinas, chairs, trunks, 
lace, ribbons, pomatum, scents, almanacs, date cases, clocks, 
watches, dictionaries, ready reckonersf1, etc., were sold. Ibid. 
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